Prior research shows that, under realistic conditions, jurors overly harshly evaluate audit firm culpability when financial statement fraud emerges after issuance of a clean audit opinion. In two experiments, we test theory-based predictions that three topical regulatory factors can reduce jurors’ assessments of audit firm culpability as well as predictions about two key mediators through which these factors effectively operate. The three factors are an auditor judgment rule (AJR) prohibiting juror second-guessing of auditor judgments made in good faith and with a reasonable basis, a critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure in the audit report that pertains to the disputed area, and a juror negligence training (JNT) in which jurors learn and apply legal concepts before the case evaluation. The two mediators are jurors’ perceptions that the audit firm missed a readily detectable fraud (detectability) and tacitly assented to management’s potentially fraudulent actions (acquiescence). Finally, we also test a “reactance-effects” prediction whereby, even while the AJR and JNT interventions decrease assessed auditor culpability on average, we expect the interventions will simultaneously increase assessed damages among the relatively small subset of jurors finding against the audit firm in their presence relative to jurors finding against the audit firm in their absence. Results support our predictions and also demonstrate that the mediators of perceived detectability and acquiescence can underlie these effects.

先前的研究表明，在现实情况下，当发布明确的审计意见后出现财务报表欺诈时，陪审员会过分粗暴地评估审计公司的罪行。在两个实验中，我们测试了基于理论的预测，即三个主题性的监管因素可以减少陪审员对审计公司罪责的评估，以及有关两个因素可以有效运作的关键中介的预测。这三个因素是一个审计师判断规则（AJR），该规则禁止以真诚和合理的依据对陪审员的判断进行陪审团评议；在审计报告中披露与争议区域有关的关键审计事项（CAM），以及陪审员过失培训（JNT）中，陪审员在案件评估之前学习并运用法律概念。两位调解员是陪审员，他们认为审计公司错过了易于发现的欺诈行为（可检测性），并默认同意管理层的潜在欺诈行为（默认）。最后，我们还测试了一个“反应效应”预测，据此，即使AJR和JNT干预措施平均降低了评估审计师的罪责，我们预计，干预措施将同时增加相对较小的陪审员群体对审计事务所的评估损失。相对于陪审团在缺席的情况下针对审计公司的陪审团，他们的存在。结果支持我们的预测，也证明了可检测性和默认设置可能是这些影响的基础。