We experimentally investigate how increases in legally required minimum wages affect wage offers, wage premiums (i.e., the excess of wages over the minimum wage), and employee effort. Prior research has documented a gift-exchange relationship between firms and employees, whereby higher wage offers lead to higher effort. However, when the minimum wage increases, expectations regarding gift wages may also change. We predict that, following such a change, firms and employees will self-servingly determine their reference point for gift wages. As a result, while firms will increase wage offers, wage premiums will decline, and thus employees will not increase their effort. The results of (1) a laboratory experiment and (2) two online experiments are consistent with our predictions, suggesting that minimum-wage increases can have a negative effect on employee effort. Ultimately, employees respond to equivalent wages differently depending on the context surrounding the wage level. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

我们通过实验研究了法律上要求的最低工资水平的提高如何影响工资提议，工资溢价（即，工资超出最低工资标准的部分）和员工的工作量。先前的研究记录了企业与员工之间的礼物交换关系，因此更高的工资提供了更多的努力。但是，当最低工资提高时，对礼物工资的期望也可能会发生变化。我们预计，随着这种变化，公司和员工将自发地确定他们的礼品工资参考点。结果，尽管公司将增加工资待遇，但工资溢价将下降，因此员工将不会增加工作量。（1）实验室实验和（2）两个在线实验的结果与我们的预测相符，这表明最低工资的提高可能会对员工的工作产生负面影响。最终，员工对同等工资的反应取决于围绕工资水平的情况。讨论了对理论和实践的影响。