In many domains, committees bargain over a sequence of policies and a policy remains in effect until a new agreement is reached. In this paper, I argue that, in order to assess the consequences of veto power, it is important to take into account this dynamic aspect. I analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game with an endogenous status quo policy. I show that full appropriation by the veto player is the only stable policy when legislators are sufficiently impatient; and that, irrespective of legislators' patience and the initial division of resources, there is always an equilibrium where policy eventually gets arbitrarily close to full appropriation by the veto player. In this equilibrium, increasing legislators' patience or decreasing the veto player's proposal power makes convergence to this outcome slower and the veto player supports reforms that decrease his allocation. The main predictions of the theory find support in controlled laboratory experiments.

在许多领域中，委员会就一系列政策进行讨价还价，并且政策一直有效，直到达成新协议为止。在本文中，我认为，以评估否决权的后果，必须考虑到这一点很重要动态方面。我用内生的现状政策分析了无限重复的美元博弈。我表明，当立法者足够耐心时，否决权人的全额拨款是唯一稳定的政策。而且，无论立法者的耐心和最初的资源分配如何，总有一个平衡点，最终政策最终会任意否决否决权。在这种平衡中，增加立法者的耐心或减少否决权人的提议权会使对这一结果的收敛变慢，而否决权人则支持减少其分配的改革。该理论的主要预测为受控实验室实验提供了支持。