Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine two opposing approaches to the effects of power on negotiation: a “collaborative approach” of power and a “competitive approach” of power. Accordingly, the authors state oppositional hypotheses based on each approach. This study further investigates the mediating role of the perceived threat of the negotiation and the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e. topics that touch on one’s power position versus topics that are related to the tasks one needs to perform) in this relationship. Finally, the authors state a moderated mediation hypothesis where they expected that the negotiation topic would moderate the indirect effect of power on negotiation strategies.

Design/methodology/approach

A vignette study (N = 279) and a negotiation game (N = 138) were conducted where the power within dyads was manipulated.

Findings

Study 1 showed that powerholders prefer collaborative strategies, whereas powerless negotiators prefer competitive strategies. Perceived threat of the negotiation mediated this effect. Furthermore, both Studies 1 and 2 showed that the negotiation topic moderates the effect of power on negotiation strategies providing further support for the collaborative approach of power. Finally, Study 1 provided partial support for the moderated mediation hypothesis.

Research limitations/implications

Both Studies 1 and 2 are experimental studies. A field study should try to replicate these results in the future.

Practical implications

This study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature. The results might be of great importance to large organizations where power asymmetries constitute an integral part of the employee/manager interactions.

Originality/value

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to show the moderating role of negotiation topic in the relationship between power and negotiation.

中文翻译：

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权力对谈判的影响：合作与竞争方式的比较

目的

这项研究的目的是研究权力对谈判影响的两种相反的方法：权力的“合作方式”和权力的“竞争方式”。因此，作者基于每种方法陈述了相反的假设。这项研究进一步调查了在这种关系中谈判威胁的中介作用和谈判主题（即，与某人的权力地位有关的主题与与一个人需要执行的任务有关的主题）的协调作用。最后，作者陈述了一个适度的调解假设，他们希望谈判话题能够缓和权力对谈判策略的间接影响。

设计/方法/方法

进行了小插图研究（N = 279）和协商游戏（N = 138），其中操纵了二元组中的力量。

发现

研究1表明，掌权者更喜欢协作策略，而无权的谈判者更喜欢竞争策略。可以感觉到的谈判威胁介导了这种影响。此外，研究1和研究2均表明，谈判主题减轻了权力对谈判策略的影响，为权力的协作方法提供了进一步的支持。最后，研究1为调解假说提供了部分支持。

研究局限/意义

研究1和2均为实验研究。现场研究应在将来尝试复制这些结果。

实际影响

这项研究阐明了权力对谈判的影响，并解决了谈判文献中不一致的结论。对于权力不对称构成员工/管理人员交互的组成部分的大型组织，结果可能非常重要。

创意/价值

据作者所知，这是第一个显示谈判主题在权力与谈判之间的关系中起调节作用的研究。