This article examines the Swedish security establishment's counterintelligence measures directed against British preparations for economic warfare in Scandinavia in 1939–40. Although Stockholm was an intense spying location, there exists a gap in the historiography concerning the topic. At the beginning of the war, the British government regarded economic warfare as an efficient tool for shaking the foundations of the German war economy. Economic warfare included blockades, sabotage, psychological warfare, and diplomatic threats. The present study explores Swedish operations against George Binney, who worked for the British government in war-trade-related issues. The article shows that the Swedish security service had difficulties in obtaining intelligence on Binney because of the reliance on casual informants, whose information was imprecise and sometimes misleading. The British succeeded in uncovering some of the Swedish counterintelligence tactics and this led to problems in capturing significant information, for example, via communication monitoring. The Swedish archival sources have added considerable new empirical details regarding British preparations for blockade running in July 1940. The study also shows that British officials operated on very dangerous ground, as some of the individuals they worked with were enemy agents or in a position to forward information in several different directions.

本文研究了瑞典安全机构针对1939–40年英国在斯堪的纳维亚半岛进行经济战的准备而采取的反情报措施。尽管斯德哥尔摩是一个非常活跃的间​​谍地点，但史学在该主题上还是存在差距。战争开始时，英国政府将经济战视为震撼德国战争经济基础的有效工具。经济战包括封锁，破坏，心理战和外交威胁。本研究探讨了瑞典针对乔治·本尼（George Binney）的行动，乔治·本尼曾在英国政府与战争贸易有关的问题上工作。文章显示，由于依赖临时人员，瑞典安全部门难以获得有关Binney的情报，他们的信息不准确，有时会产生误导。英国人成功地发现了瑞典的一些反情报策略，这导致在捕获重要信息方面出现问题，例如通过通信监视。瑞典档案资料为1940年7月英国进行封锁的准备工作增加了许多新的经验细节。研究还表明，英国官员的行动非常危险，因为与他们一起工作的某些人是敌方特工或有能力前进的人。几个不同方向的信息。