Scholars who favor shareholder primacy usually claim either that managers should not fulfill corporate duties of beneficence or that, if they are required to fulfill them, they do so by going against their obligations to shareholders. Distinguishing between structurally different types of duties of beneficence and recognizing the full force of the normative demands imposed on managers reveal that this view needs to be qualified. Although it is correct to think that managers, when acting on behalf of shareholders, are not required to fulfill wide duties of charity, they are nevertheless required to fulfill a variety of narrow duties of beneficence. What is more, the obligation to fulfill these duties arises precisely because they are acting on behalf of shareholders. As such, this article 1) refines our understanding of the duties of corporate beneficence and 2) helps to identify which duties of beneficence are imposed on managers when they are acting on behalf of shareholders.

支持股东至上的学者通常声称经理不应该履行公司的慈善义务，或者如果他们被要求履行这些义务，他们就会违背对股东的义务。区分结构上不同类型的慈善义务并认识到强加给管理者的规范要求的全部力量表明，这种观点需要加以限定。尽管认为经理在代表股东行事时不需要履行广泛的慈善义务是正确的，但他们仍然需要履行各种狭隘的慈善义务。更重要的是，履行这些职责的义务正是因为他们代表股东行事。因此，本文 1) 完善了我们对公司慈善义务的理解，2) 有助于确定经理在代表股东行事时应承担哪些慈善义务。