Pipeline energy storage in district heating networks (DHNs) has shown to be capable of improving energy efficiency in an integrated electricity and heat system (IEHS). However, most electric power networks (EPNs) and DHNs are managed by different entities, while the incentives inducing such flexibilities from DHNs have been seldom discussed. This paper fills the research gap by investigating price incentives offered by EPNs to encourage DHN operators to fully utilize pipeline energy storage. Individual interests of EPNs and DHNs are addressed via a bi-level model, where the EPN operator determines the best price incentive based on optimal power flow (OPF) in the upper-level, while the lower-level problem describes the optimal response of the DHN operator based on optimal thermal flow (OTF). To preserve the privacy of DHNs in distributed operation, a reduced and accurate OTF model is then proposed where internal states are eliminated and system parameters are not exposed, which also relieves model complexity. Finally, a price-quantity decomposition method along with warm-start strategies are proposed to solve the reduced bi-level model, and the solution obtained is interpreted as the equilibrium of Stackelberg competition between EPNs and DHNs. Case studies of two IEHSs validate that the proposed decomposition method can efficiently reach Stackelberg equilibrium in a distributed setting, while the introduced incentive-based coordination mechanism can effectively improve social welfare by lowering total costs in both EPNs and DHNs.

区域供热网络（DHN）中的管道能量存储已显示出能够提高综合电热系统（IEHS）的能源效率的能力。但是，大多数电力网络（EPN）和DHN由不同的实体管理，而很少讨论从DHN引发这种灵活性的激励措施。本文通过调查EPN为鼓励DHN运营商充分利用管道储能提供的价格激励措施来填补研究空白​​。EPN和DHN的个人利益通过双层模型解决，其中EPN运营商根据上层的最佳潮流（OPF）确定最佳价格激励，而下层问题则描述了上层的最佳响应。 DHN运算符基于最佳热流（OTF）。为了在分布式操作中保护DHN的隐私，然后，提出了一种简化且精确的OTF模型，该模型消除了内部状态并且不公开系统参数，这也减轻了模型的复杂性。最后，提出了一种价格量分解方法和热启动策略来求解简化的双层模型，并将获得的解解释为EPN和DHN之间的Stackelberg竞争均衡。对两个IEHS的案例研究证实，所提出的分解方法可以在分布式环境中有效地达到Stackelberg平衡，而引入的基于激励的协调机制可以通过降低EPN和DHN的总成本来有效地改善社会福利。最后，提出了一种价格量分解方法和热启动策略来求解简化的双层模型，并将获得的解解释为EPN和DHN之间的Stackelberg竞争均衡。对两个IEHS的案例研究证实，所提出的分解方法可以在分布式环境中有效地达到Stackelberg平衡，而引入的基于激励的协调机制可以通过降低EPN和DHN的总成本来有效地改善社会福利。最后，提出了一种价格量分解方法和热启动策略来求解简化的双层模型，并将获得的解解释为EPN和DHN之间的Stackelberg竞争均衡。对两个IEHS的案例研究证实，所提出的分解方法可以在分布式环境中有效地达到Stackelberg平衡，而引入的基于激励的协调机制可以通过降低EPN和DHN的总成本来有效地改善社会福利。