In 1985 I was in graduate school, creating a list of possible dissertation topics looking at the history of science journalism in the United States after World War II. I talked over the options with my colleagues in the University of Pennsylvania’s Department of History and Sociology of Science. One of them,David Rhees, had looked at popularization of science in theUnited States after World War I. Somewhat cryptically, he said that he knew that John Burnham at Ohio State was writing a book on popularization. He said he couldn’t tell me more about it. As it turned out, Burnham had shared with Rhees an early draft of the manuscript for How Superstition Won and Science Lost. Rhees, later the longtime director of the Bakken Library and Museum of Electricity and Life, didn’t feel he had permission to say what was in the manuscript. So I wrote to Burnhammyself (remember, those were still the days of typewritten letters). In the last three months, since being offered the chance to write this reflection, I’ve dug through my files, trying to find Burnham’s response. Almost thirty-five years later, I remember it vividly, and so I wish I could quote it correctly. Alas, it hasn’t surfaced. But in my memory I still see the gracious words, which ran something like this: “I imagine it’s scary to be a graduate student, starting a project and then discovering a senior historian is already writing a book on that topic. But I can assure you, what I’m writing won’t interfere with your work at all. Indeed, I’m not at all sure I should share it with you, because it’s not a very good example of historical writing. It’s more of a polemic than a history.” The difference between polemic and history was key to my reaction to the work. For although I learned much about the historian’s craft from Burnham’s writing, I fundamentally disagreed with his argument. At one level, the manuscript was a model of historical writing: careful, detailed exposition, backed up with archival and original source citations of such detail that I could hardly imagine going through so much material. (Again, in my memory: I was seeing photocopies of pages on which he’d taped paragraphs and their associated notes, line after line of detailed bibliographic information.) Only a historian of Burnham’s experience and breadth of interests could show how historical detail could be marshaled to make an argument that was

中文翻译：

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论战与历史：对约翰·C·伯纳姆的《迷信如何获胜和科学失落》的反思

1985 年，我在读研究生时，创建了一份可能的论文主题清单，这些主题是关于二战后美国科学新闻史的。我与宾夕法尼亚大学历史与科学社会学系的同事讨论了这些选择。其中一个人，大卫·瑞斯，在第一次世界大战后研究了美国的科学普及。有点神秘，他说他知道俄亥俄州立大学的约翰伯纳姆正在写一本关于普及的书。他说他不能告诉我更多。事实证明，伯纳姆与瑞斯分享了《迷信如何赢得和科学失落》手稿的早期草稿。Rhees，后来担任巴肯图书馆和电力与生命博物馆的长期馆长，认为他无权说出手稿中的内容。所以我写信给 Burnhammyself（请记住，那些仍然是打字信件的时代）。在过去的三个月里，自从有机会写这篇反思后，我翻遍了我的文件，试图找到伯纳姆的回应。将近三十五年后，我清楚地记得它，所以我希望我能正确引用它。唉，它还没有浮出水面。但在我的记忆中，我仍然看到这样亲切的话语：“我想象成为一名研究生，开始一个项目，然后发现一位资深历史学家已经在写一本关于该主题的书，这很可怕。但我可以向你保证，我写的东西根本不会干扰你的工作。确实，我完全不确定是否应该与您分享，因为它不是历史写作的一个很好的例子。这与其说是历史，不如说是一场论战。” 论战和历史之间的差异是我对作品反应的关键。因为虽然我从伯纳姆的著作中学到了很多关于历史学家的技艺，但我从根本上不同意他的论点。在一个层面上，这份手稿是历史写作的典范：仔细、详细的阐述，并以档案和原始来源引用的如此详细的资料为后盾，我几乎无法想象要阅读这么多材料。（再一次，在我的记忆中：我看到他在上面记录了段落及其相关注释的页面的影印本，一行一行详细的书目信息。）只有了解伯纳姆经验和广泛兴趣的历史学家才能展示历史细节如何能够被编组提出一个论点 因为虽然我从伯纳姆的著作中学到了很多关于历史学家的技艺，但我从根本上不同意他的论点。在一个层面上，这份手稿是历史写作的典范：仔细、详细的阐述，并以档案和原始来源引用的如此详细的资料为后盾，我几乎无法想象要阅读这么多材料。（再一次，在我的记忆中：我看到他在上面记录了段落及其相关注释的页面的影印本，一行一行详细的书目信息。）只有了解伯纳姆经验和广泛兴趣的历史学家才能展示历史细节如何能够被编组提出一个论点 因为虽然我从伯纳姆的著作中学到了很多关于历史学家的技艺，但我从根本上不同意他的论点。在一个层面上，这份手稿是历史写作的典范：仔细、详细的阐述，并以档案和原始来源引用的如此详细的资料为后盾，我几乎无法想象要阅读这么多材料。（再一次，在我的记忆中：我看到他在上面记录了段落及其相关注释的页面的影印本，一行一行详细的书目信息。）只有了解伯纳姆经验和广泛兴趣的历史学家才能展示历史细节如何能够被编组提出一个论点 支持档案和原始来源引用的如此详细的信息，我几乎无法想象要阅读这么多材料。（再一次，在我的记忆中：我看到他在上面记录了段落及其相关注释的页面的影印本，一行一行详细的书目信息。）只有了解伯纳姆经验和广泛兴趣的历史学家才能展示历史细节如何能够被编组提出一个论点 支持档案和原始来源引用的如此详细的信息，我几乎无法想象要阅读这么多材料。（再一次，在我的记忆中：我看到他在上面记录了段落及其相关注释的页面的影印本，一行一行详细的书目信息。）只有了解伯纳姆经验和广泛兴趣的历史学家才能展示历史细节如何能够被编组提出一个论点