Two recent events bookend my reflections on what is living and what is dead in John Burnham’s How Superstition Won and Science Lost. The first, held in over a hundred cities around the world on 4 May 2019, is the third iteration of the March for Science. From New York to Xiamen, Buenos Aires to Hyderabad, what could attest more dramatically to the extended global urgency of Burnham’s diagnoses? Had it not already been clear, in 1987, that science—as a process of reasoning empirically and naturalistically—had failed to take hold in societies as a common “way of life,” then it is certainly all too evident in our “post-truth” age of alternative facts and climate change denial. The March for Science can be seen as a worldwide regeneration of the moral imperative that drove Burnham’s ideal of popularization, wherein civically oriented “men of science,” filled with “evangelical fervor,” sought to disseminate not only the products of their research but also the tools that would render each individual capable to make her own reasoned judgments (pp. 23–27, 247–252). The second event weighing on my thoughts brings us to one of the principal sites of my own research: Japan. On 24 April 2019 the Japanese Parliament passed a bill to compensate those remaining survivors—an estimated twenty-five thousand persons—who had been forcibly sterilized under its Eugenic Protection Law, abolished only in 1996. If the March for Science ignites our evangelical fervor, then the legacy of the Eugenic Protection Law introduces challenges to it. As Michael Gordin underscores in his contribution to this Second Look section, the omission of eugenics from How Superstition Won was, however startling, deliberate. Eugenics campaigns often exemplified precisely those traits that Burnham praised as effectively combating superstition. Practicing scientists from Francis Galton to Alfred Ploetz, motivated by a strong ideal of the public good, presented systematic reasoning in lecture halls and learned journals that had yet to be fully conquered by advertising and consumerism. These campaigns, mobilizing conservatives and radicals alike, arguably represented some of the most “successful”

中文翻译：

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谁的科学赢了或输了？（之后还有什么理由？）

最近发生的两件事结束了我对约翰·伯纳姆 (John Burnham) 的《迷信如何获胜和科学失落》(How Superstition Won and Science Lost) 中生与死的反思。第一次于 2019 年 5 月 4 日在全球一百多个城市举行，是科学三月的第三次迭代。从纽约到厦门，从布宜诺斯艾利斯到海得拉巴，还有什么能更显着地证明伯纳姆诊断在全球范围内的紧迫性？如果在 1987 年还不清楚科学——作为一种经验和自然推理的过程——未能在社会中成为一种普遍的“生活方式”，那么这在我们的“后真相”替代事实和否认气候变化的时代。科学大游行可以被视为推动伯纳姆普及理想的道德要求的全球再生，其中以公民为导向的“科学人，”充满“福音派热情”，不仅要传播他们的研究成果，还要传播使每个人能够做出自己的理性判断的工具（第 23-27、247-252 页）。影响我思考的第二个事件将我们带到了我自己研究的主要地点之一：日本。2019 年 4 月 24 日，日本议会通过了一项法案，以补偿那些根据优生保护法（仅在 1996 年才废除）被强制绝育的剩余幸存者（​​估计有两万五千人）。那么优生保护法的遗产给它带来了挑战。正如迈克尔·戈丁在他对第二眼部分的贡献中所强调的那样，《迷信如何赢得》中对优生学的遗漏，无论多么令人吃惊，都是故意的。优生学运动往往恰恰体现了伯纳姆称赞为有效打击迷信的那些特征。从弗朗西斯·高尔顿 (Francis Galton) 到阿尔弗雷德·普洛茨 (Alfred Ploetz) 的实践科学家，在强烈的公共利益理想的推动下，在演讲厅和学术期刊中展示了尚未被广告和消费主义完全征服的系统推理。这些动员保守派和激进分子的运动可以说代表了一些最“成功”的