The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the interactive conflicts between business and governmental authorities in the regulatory process of an emerging business model: sharing economy. Focusing on bike sharing system, the study also investigates the conflict-handling strategy of bike sharing companies and government regulation.,An evolutionary game model is introduced to illustrate the interactive conflict between bike sharing companies and government regulation, combined with system dynamics (SD) to simulate the evolutionary conflict-handling strategies between the two players.,The dynamic strategies of the two players are observed, and under five conditions the conflict outcomes are evolutionary stable states. Simulations show that each party sacrifices part of its interest and adjust its strategy according to that of the other, indicating the conflict-handling strategy as a compromising mode. Furthermore, the strategies of bike sharing companies are sensitive to additional operation and maintenance costs for producing low-quality bicycles and costs of positive regulation, which provides theoretical guidance for regulatory authorities.,The station-less bike sharing come up in China recently, and it is an important research field of entrepreneurship. Owing to the uniqueness and novelty of the phenomenon, conflicts and challenges exist during the regulation process. Thus, the study practically contributes to the conflict-handling strategies of businesses and government under the context of sharing economy. Methodologically, as a novel issue with less available data to carry out empirical research, this study combines evolutionary game theory with SD to shed light on the complex interactions between businesses and government. The research method can be applied to other entrepreneurial studies.

中文翻译：

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自行车共享系统中企业与政府之间的冲突

本文的目的是阐述新兴经济模式（共享经济）的监管过程中企业与政府部门之间的互动冲突。该研究以自行车共享系统为重点，研究了自行车共享公司与政府监管的冲突处理策略。结合系统动力学（SD），引入了演化博弈模型来说明自行车共享公司与政府监管之间的互动冲突。为了模拟两个参与者之间的进化冲突处理策略，观察了两个参与者的动态策略，在五个条件下冲突的结果是进化稳定状态。模拟表明，每一方都牺牲了部分利益，并根据另一方的利益来调整其策略，将冲突处理策略指示为一种折衷模式。此外，自行车共享公司的策略对生产低质量自行车的额外运营和维护成本以及积极监管的成本很敏感，这为监管机构提供了理论指导。这是创业的重要研究领域。由于这种现象的独特性和新颖性，在监管过程中存在冲突和挑战。因此，该研究实际上为共享经济背景下的企业与政府的冲突处理策略做出了贡献。从方法上讲，作为一个新问题，缺乏可用的数据来进行实证研究，这项研究将演化博弈论与SD相结合，以阐明企业与政府之间的复杂互动。该研究方法可以应用于其他创业研究。