The Cyprus problem is one of the most protracted and complex conflicts in the world. This article uses poliheuristic (PH) theory to analyze Turkey’s decision-making during the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974. We utilize the PH model (Mintz 1993, 2004) and its method to systematically examine the decision-making process and outcomes during the three crises. We present primary evidence from governmental archives and secondary from media sources. The two hypotheses derived from the PH literature are supported by evidence. Results confirm Turkish decision-makers employed two-stage decision-making during each crisis. In the first stage, Turkish leaders followed the noncompensatory rule and eliminated options that could incur losses. In the second stage, their calculations were more in line with expected utility maximization. Implications of the case study in terms of PH model, foreign policy analysis, and international relations theory are discussed in the conclusion.

中文翻译：

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土耳其和塞浦路斯：对 1964 年、1967 年和 1974 年危机期间决策的多元启发式分析

塞浦路斯问题是世界上最持久和最复杂的冲突之一。本文使用启发式 (PH) 理论来分析土耳其在 1964、1967 和 1974 年塞浦路斯危机期间的决策。我们利用 PH 模型 (Mintz 1993, 2004) 及其方法系统地检查决策过程和结果在这三场危机中。我们提供来自政府档案的主要证据和媒体来源的次要证据。源自 PH 文献的两个假设得到了证据的支持。结果证实，土耳其决策者在每次危机期间都采用两阶段决策。在第一阶段，土耳其领导人遵循非补偿规则，消除了可能导致损失的选项。在第二阶段，他们的计算更符合预期效用最大化。