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Peacekeeping Deployments and Mutinies in African Sending States
Foreign Policy Analysis ( IF 1.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-23 , DOI: 10.1093/fpa/oraa011
Rebecca Schiel 1 , Jonathan Powell 1 , Ursula Daxecker 2
Affiliation  

Research on host-country effects of peacekeeping deployments has highlighted destabilizing consequences for contributing states, suggesting that deployments can increase the willingness and ability of soldiers to mutiny or attempt coups. Yet others expect peacekeeping contributions can bring a variety of benefits, including improved civilian control of the armed forces. We reconcile these conflicting assessments in two ways. First, we identify important differences across peacekeeping organizations. Missions undertaken by the UN are generally better funded and equipped, invoke selection criteria that should produce fewer grievances than missions operated by regional organizations, and may be more risk averse. The benefits or hazards of peacekeeping can thus vary substantially, leading to different consequences for organizations. Second, the pros and cons of peacekeeping can incentivize mutinies and coups differently. When grievances are present, financial incentives of peacekeeping may prompt soldiers to prefer mutiny over coups to avoid being disqualified from future participation. We assess these expectations for African states’ participation in UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations from 1990-2011. We find no evidence that UN peacekeeping deployments increase mutiny risk, while non-UN deployments have a positive effect on the occurrence of mutiny. These findings remain robust across a large number of model specifications.

中文翻译:

非洲派遣国的维和部署和兵变

对维和部署对东道国影响的研究强调了对派遣国的不稳定后果,表明部署可以增加士兵叛变或企图政变的意愿和能力。还有一些人期望维和贡献可以带来各种好处,包括改善文职人员对武装部队的控制。我们以两种方式调和这些相互矛盾的评估。首先,我们确定维和组织之间的重要差异。联合国执行的任务通常有更好的资金和装备,其选择标准应该比区域组织执行的任务产生更少的不满,并且可能更规避风险。因此,维持和平的好处或危险可能会有很大差异,从而对组织产生不同的后果。第二,维和的利弊可以以不同的方式激励兵变和政变。当存在不满时,维和的经济激励可能会促使士兵更喜欢兵变而不是政变,以避免被取消未来参与的资格。我们评估了 1990 年至 2011 年非洲国家参与联合国和非联合国维和行动的这些期望。我们没有发现任何证据表明联合国维和部署会增加兵变风险,而非联合国部署对兵变发生有积极影响。这些发现在大量模型规范中仍然稳健。我们评估了 1990 年至 2011 年非洲国家参与联合国和非联合国维和行动的这些期望。我们没有发现任何证据表明联合国维和部署会增加兵变风险,而非联合国部署对兵变发生有积极影响。这些发现在大量模型规范中仍然稳健。我们评估了 1990-2011 年非洲国家参与联合国和非联合国维和行动的这些期望。我们没有发现任何证据表明联合国维和部署会增加兵变风险,而非联合国部署对兵变发生有积极影响。这些发现在大量模型规范中仍然稳健。
更新日期:2020-04-23
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