Political developments since the 2008 financial crisis have sparked renewed interest in the electoral implications of economic downturns. Research describes a correlation between adverse economic conditions and support for radical parties campaigning on the populist promise to retake the country from a corrupt elite. But does the success of radical parties following economic crises rely on people who are directly affected? To answer this question, we examine whether individual-level changes in economic circumstances drive support for radical parties across the ideological divide. Analyzing eight waves of panel data collected in The Netherlands, before, during, and after the Great Recession (2007–2015), we demonstrate that people who experienced an income loss became more supportive of the radical left but not of the radical right. Looking at these parties’ core concerns, we find that income loss increased support for income redistribution championed by the radical left, but less so for the anti-immigration policies championed by the radical right. Our study establishes more directly than extant research the micro-foundations of support for radical parties across the ideological divide.

中文翻译：

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物质环境的变化是否会推动对民粹主义激进政党的支持？2007-2015 年大衰退期间荷兰的面板数据证据

自 2008 年金融危机以来的政治发展重新激发了人们对经济衰退对选举的影响的兴趣。研究描述了不利的经济条件与支持激进政党之间的相关性，这些政党以民粹主义的承诺从腐败的精英手中夺回国家。但是，经济危机后激进政党的成功是否依赖于直接受到影响的人？为了回答这个问题，我们研究了个人层面的经济环境变化是否会推动跨越意识形态鸿沟的激进政党的支持。分析在大衰退（2007-2015 年）之前、期间和之后在荷兰收集的八波面板数据，我们证明经历过收入损失的人变得更支持激进的左翼，而不是激进的右翼。纵观这些政党的核心关切，我们发现收入损失增加了对激进左翼倡导的收入再分配的支持，但对激进右翼倡导的反移民政策的支持则较少。我们的研究比现有研究更直接地建立了跨越意识形态鸿沟支持激进政党的微观基础。