Reasons internalists claim that facts about normative reasons for action are facts about which actions would promote an agent’s goals and values (perhaps moderately idealized). Reasons internalism is popular, even though paradigmatic versions have moral consequences many find unwelcome. This article reconstructs an influential but understudied argument for reasons internalism, the “if I were you” argument, which is due to Bernard Williams and Kate Manne. I raise an objection to the argument and argue that replying to it requires reasons internalists to accept controversial metaethical or epistemological commitments with which their theory has not traditionally been associated.

中文翻译：

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内在原因和哭狼的男孩

理由内在主义者声称，关于行动的规范理由的事实是关于哪些行动会促进代理人的目标和价值观（也许是适度理想化的）的事实。内在主义很受欢迎的原因，即使范式版本具有许多不受欢迎的道德后果。这篇文章重建了一个有影响但未被充分研究的内在主义论点，即“如果我是你”的论点，这是由伯纳德·威廉姆斯和凯特·曼恩提出的。我对这个论点提出反对意见，并认为要回应它，内在主义者需要有理由接受有争议的元伦理学或认识论承诺，而他们的理论传统上与这些承诺无关。