Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer “yes” and “no,” respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. In this article, I develop a risk-based reductio argument that shows that there can be no adequate partially aggregative view. I then argue that the only plausible response to this reductio is to accept a fully aggregative view.

中文翻译：

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聚合、风险和归约

你应该拯救多少人免于瘫痪而不是拯救一个人免于死亡？有多少人应该从偏头痛中拯救出来，而不是从死亡中拯救一个人？许多人分别回答“是”和“否”。部分聚合道德观点的目的是捕捉和证明这些直觉的组合。在本文中，我提出了一个基于风险的归约论证，表明不存在充分的部分聚合视图。然后我争辩说，对这种简化的唯一合理的反应是接受一个完全聚合的观点。