Bernard Williams claims that we should feel “agent-regret” for bad events we cause but for which we are not blameworthy. Such agent-regret involves no presupposition of fault, yet it also involves a need to personally make amends. This combination suggests that agent-regret, even if virtuous, is inherently irrational. In this paper, I defend agent-regret from attempts to explain it away as a confusion of other attitudes. I argue that the rationality of agent-regret is found in how it makes sense as a response to conflicts that might arise between people through nothing more than bad luck.

中文翻译：

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Agent-Regret 合理吗？

伯纳德·威廉姆斯 (Bernard Williams) 声称，我们应该为自己造成但不应受到指责的不良事件感到“代理人后悔”。这种代理人的后悔不涉及过失的预设，但也涉及到个人进行弥补的需要。这种组合表明代理人后悔，即使是有道德的，本质上也是非理性的。在这篇论文中，我为代理人的遗憾辩护，不要试图将其解释为对其他态度的混淆。我认为，代理人后悔的合理性在于它如何作为对人与人之间可能因运气不佳而发生的冲突的回应而变得有意义。