In recent work, Michael Smith argues that particular desires are constitutive of ideal agency and draws on his dispositional account of reasons to establish the normative significance of those desires. In a sustained critique, Michael Bukowski objects that Smith’s recent arguments that particular desires are constitutive of ideal agency rely on indefensible premises and his dispositional account of reasons is unable to establish the normative significance of such desires. On the contrary, I argue not only that Smith has the resources to respond to these objections but also that the form of Smith’s constitutivist explanation has unappreciated explanatory strengths.

中文翻译：

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功能性本构主义被误解的资源：对史密斯本构主义的有限辩护

在最近的工作中，迈克尔·史密斯认为特定的欲望是理想能动性的组成部分，并利用他对原因的倾向性解释来确定这些欲望的规范意义。在持续的批评中，迈克尔·布考斯基（Michael Bukowski）反对史密斯最近的论点，即特定欲望是理想能动性的组成部分，这一论点依赖于站不住脚的前提，而他对理由的倾向性解释无法确立此类欲望的规范意义。相反，我认为不仅斯密有资源来回应这些反对意见，而且斯密的构成主义解释的形式具有未被重视的解释优势。