This article provides theoretical foundations to the widespread intuition that an individual duty to reduce one's carbon emissions should not be overly demanding, and should leave some space to personal life-projects. It does so by looking into the moral structure of aggregative problems such as climate change, and argues that contributing to climate change is less wrong than causing the same amount of harm in paradigm cases of harm-doing. It follows that strong agent-relative reasons, such as consideration of the agent's most important life-projects, are likely sometimes to outweigh the reasons for refraining from contributing to climate change, especially when there is no alternative course of action. This, however, does not mean that individual carbon-emitters are off the hook, since a lot can be done to reduce carbon emissions without jeopardising one's most important life-projects.

中文翻译：

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我们的气候责任有多苛刻？无害原则在个人排放中的应用

这篇文章为普遍的直觉提供了理论基础，即个人减少碳排放的义务不应过于苛刻，应该为个人生活项目留出一些空间。它通过研究气候变化等总体问题的道德结构来做到这一点，并认为导致气候变化比在典型的伤害行为案例中造成同等程度的伤害要少得多。因此，与代理人相关的强有力的理由，例如考虑代理人最重要的生活项目，有时可能会超过不为气候变化做出贡献的理由，尤其是在没有替代行动方案的情况下。然而，这并不意味着个别的碳排放者摆脱了困境，