In this paper, we analyze how an online rental platform should choose between the one-side brokerage model (charging hosts only) and the both-side brokerage model (charging both hosts and renters). We consider a setting where a monopolistic platform connects hosts on one side with renters on the other. Renters are heterogeneous in valuing trust: Type 1 renters undervalue trust and Type 2 renters fully value trust. We first reveal that the existence of Type 1 renters makes it possible for the one-side brokerage model to be the preferable choice for a platform. Our results also indicate that it is more profitable for the platform to adopt the both-side brokerage model rather than the one-side brokerage model when the number of Type 1 renters is small and/or the cost coefficient to enable renter-side trust is small. Finally, we examine how the chosen brokerage model affects social welfare and find that only the one-side brokerage model can generate a win–win outcome for both the platform and the social planner.

在本文中，我们分析了在线租赁平台应如何在单边经纪模式（仅向房东收费）和双边经纪模式（向房东和房客均收费）之间进行选择。我们考虑一种垄断平台，在这种环境中，一侧的主机与另一侧的租户相连。承租人在评估信任方面各不相同：1类租户低估信任，而2类租户则完全估价信任。我们首先发现，类型1租户的存在使单边经纪模式成为平台的首选。我们的结果还表明，当类型1的租户数量少和/或启用租户方信任的成本系数为1时，平台采用双向经纪模式而不是单方经纪模式更有利可图。小。最后，