The concept of values is currently enjoying renewed interest in sociology; indeed, many claim that it must be treated as central to any theory of action. As introduced to American sociology from Europe by Parsons, it was transformed from a condition of possibility into an intrinsic element of the action system that could link abstract cultural imperatives to patterns of concrete behavior. When Parsons’s system dissolved, the notion of values fractured, some scholars treating values as abstract imperatives and others as behavior patterns, but they foundered on issues of the separation of validity and existence. Subtracting the notion of validity from values returns us to the concept of interests, dyadic relations between actors and objects characterized by intention, attention, and extension—in other words, investment of self. This notion of interests lacks the explanatory instability characteristic of that of values. Recasting discussions of values in terms of interests can clarify issues central to our discipline.

中文翻译：

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价值观的另一面

价值观的概念目前正在重新引起社会学的兴趣；事实上，许多人声称它必须被视为任何行动理论的核心。正如帕森斯从欧洲引入美国社会学的那样，它从一种可能性条件转变为行动系统的内在元素，可以将抽象的文化命令与具体的行为模式联系起来。当帕森斯的体系解体时，价值观念破裂，一些学者将价值视为抽象的命令，而另一些则视为行为模式，但他们在有效性与存在的分离问题上失败了。从价值中减去有效性的概念使我们回到利益的概念，行为者和对象之间的二元关系以意图、注意力和延伸为特征——换言之，对自我的投资。这种利益观念缺乏价值观念的解释性不稳定特征。根据利益重新讨论价值观可以澄清我们学科的核心问题。