当前位置:
X-MOL 学术
›
Soc. Choice Welfare
›
论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your
feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
Social Choice and Welfare ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-11 , DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01304-9 Dipjyoti Majumdar , Arunava Sen
中文翻译:
具有正相关信念的投票规则具有强大的激励兼容性
更新日期:2021-01-11
Social Choice and Welfare ( IF 0.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-11 , DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01304-9 Dipjyoti Majumdar , Arunava Sen
We investigate a voting model where each voter’s beliefs are positively correlated. We show that requiring a social choice function to be Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (d’Aspremont and Peleg in Soc Choice Welf 5:261–280, 1988) with respect to all such beliefs is not equivalent to requiring it to be strategy-proof. However, if the social choice function is also required to be efficient, it must be strategy-proof and hence, dictatorial.
中文翻译:
具有正相关信念的投票规则具有强大的激励兼容性
我们研究了一种投票模型,其中每个选民的信念都呈正相关。我们表明,就所有这些信念而言,要求社会选择功能必须与贝叶斯激励兼容(d'Aspremont和Peleg在Soc Choice Welf 5:261-280,1988年)并不等同于要求它具有策略性。但是,如果还要求社会选择功能是有效的,则它必须是策略性的,因此是独裁的。