We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.

我们回顾了单值社会选择中匿名性和中立性的不相容性。我们首先分析这两个公理的不确定性前景以及帕累托效率强加于社会选择规则，并提供一种在不违反匿名性，中立性和效率的情况下完善不确定性规则的方法。接下来，我们提出了一种弱化的中立性，称为结果性中立性，它要求坚决的社会选择规则将每个备选方案分配给相同数量的配置文件。我们探索社会选择问题，其中的结果中性解决了匿名性，中立性和坚决性之间的根本张力所导致的可能性。