This paper attempts to answer whether market competition makes relocation of a firm to an inefficient location easier through lobbying. It models a case where a larger market is more efficient location choice of the firm. It shows that if the agglomeration effect is not too high, the presence of market competition at its original location makes relocation easier. However, “race to the bottom” competition between the locations fails to take advantage of the market competition; no relocation takes place. The paper shows that instead of lobbying only with the firm, if the legislatures of the smaller market also lobby with legislatures of the larger market, “race to the bottom” is avoided, and the scope for relocation opens. At such an equilibrium, market competition makes relocation to a much smaller market possible.

中文翻译：

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市场竞争、搬迁和游说*

本文试图回答市场竞争是否通过游说使公司更容易搬迁到效率低下的地点。它模拟了一个更大的市场是公司更有效的位置选择的情况。这表明，如果集聚效应不太高，原址存在市场竞争，则更容易搬迁。然而，地点之间的“逐底竞争”并没有利用市场竞争的优势；没有搬迁。论文表明，如果小市场的立法机关也与大市场的立法机关游说，而不是只与公司游说，则可以避免“逐底竞争”，搬迁的空间也就打开了。在这样的均衡下，市场竞争使得搬迁到更小的市场成为可能。