In this study, we present a dynamic theory of management cycles under which firms endogenously switch between management regimes with different levels of profitability over time. Firms accumulate managerial capital as intangible assets such as managerial knowledge, know-how, and skills over time subject to limited contract enforcement. We show that the current managers of a firm are disciplined by not only the managerial capital accumulated through past business operations but also the market valuation of the future profitability of the firm. Through such dynamic interactions, we show that management cycles endogenously emerge and persist over time.

在这项研究中，我们提出了一种动态的管理周期理论，在这种理论下，企业会随着时间的流逝，在具有不同获利水平的管理体制之间进行内生性转换。企业随着时间的流逝，将管理资本作为无形资产积累起来，例如管理知识，专有技术和技能，这受制于有限的合同执行。我们表明，企业的现任经理不仅受制于过去业务运营中积累的管理资本，而且还受制于企业未来获利能力的市场估值。通过这种动态的互动，我们显示出管理周期会随着时间的推移内生地出现并持续。