This paper studies four Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) models that the government is a leader, and the private sector is a follower. They decide road capacity and franchise price either jointly or sequentially. We find that both the government and the private sector prefer to decide the franchise price. Social welfare can be maximized if the government decides the price, and the private sector decides capacity. We further find that the private sector does not always prefer a more extended franchise period, and the profit of the private sector is concave in the length of the concession period. Nevertheless, the government prefers a more extended concession period because of the inefficient operation cost.

本文研究了四种构建－运营－转移（BOT）模型，其中政府为领导者，私营部门为追随者。他们共同或顺序决定道路通行能力和特许权价格。我们发现，政府和私营部门都更愿意决定特许经营价格。如果政府决定价格，而私营部门决定能力，则社会福利可以最大化。我们进一步发现，私营部门并不总是喜欢延长特许经营期限，而私营部门的利润在特许经营期限的长度上是凹进的。不过，由于运营成本低廉，政府希望延长特许经营期限。