There is an intrinsic value in higher integration of multi-carrier energy systems (especially gas and electricity), to increase operational flexibility in the electricity system and to improve allocation of resources in gas and electricity networks. The integration of different energy carrier markets is challenging due to the existence of physical and economic dependencies between the different energy carriers. We propose in this paper an integrated day-ahead multi-carrier gas, electricity and heat market clearing which includes new types of orders and constraints on these orders to represent techno-economic constraints of con-version and storage technologies. We prove that the proposed market clearing gives rise to competitive equilibria. In addition, we propose two decentralised clearing algorithms which differ in how the decomposition of the underlying centralised clearing optimisation problem is performed. This has implications in terms of the involved agents and their mutual information exchange. It is proven that they yield solutions equivalent to the centralised market clearing under a mild assumption of sufficient number of iterations. We argue that such an integrated multi-carrier energy market mitigates (spot) market risks faced by market participants and enables better spot pricing of the different energy carriers. The results show that conversion/storage technology owners would suffer from losses and/or opportunity costs, if they were obliged to only use elementary orders. For the test cases considered in this article, sum of losses and opportunity costs could reach up to 13,000 €/day and 9,000 €/day respectively, compared with the case where conversion and storage orders are used.

多载波能源系统（尤其是天然气和电力）的更高集成度具有内在价值，可以提高电力系统的运营灵活性并改善天然气和电力网络中的资源分配。由于不同能源载体之间存在物理和经济依赖性，因此不同能源载体市场的整合具有挑战性。我们在本文中提出了一种集成的日前多载体天然气，电力和热力市场清算服务，其中包括新型订单和对这些订单的约束，以代表转换和存储技术的技术经济约束。我们证明，提议的市场清算会引起竞争均衡。此外，我们提出了两种分散式清算算法，它们的区别在于执行底层集中式清算优化问题的方式。这对涉及的代理及其相互信息交换具有影响。在足够的迭代次数的温和假设下，事实证明它们可以提供与集中式市场清算相当的解决方案。我们认为，这样一个集成的多运营商能源市场可以减轻市场参与者所面临的（现货）市场风险，并使不同能源运营商的现货定价更好。结果表明，如果转换/存储技术所有者仅被迫使用基本订单，他们将遭受损失和/或机会成本。对于本文中考虑的测试案例，损失和机会成本之和可能高达13。