Against the background of omnichannel retailing, this paper tries to explore the incentive conditions/regions of adopting integrated management service (IMS) and the operational strategies/performance for the assembly system with direct omnichannel (AS). Six different game-theoretical decision models, including a centralized, two decentralized and a coordination decision modelssss for the AS, and a centralized and a coordination decision models for the assembly system with direct omnichannel and IMS (ASI), are developed, analyzed and compared, respectively. Based on an electronic product case, the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses are conducted. On this basis, the analytical and numerical results are compared and validated to derive managerial insights. It is found that only when the dual incentive ratio indicators are in the quadrant \(\{ \alpha \ge 1\) and \(\beta \ge 1\}\) of bidimensional incentive region matrix would the AS and IMS provider have the incentive to introduce and provide IMS. Introducing and providing IMS can effectively enhance the ability of quick response, boost the collaborative operations, and improve the operational performance of the AS. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract-based coordination strategy can effectively improve the operational performance of ASI.

在全渠道零售的背景下，本文试图探索采用综合管理服务（IMS）的激励条件/区域以及直接全渠道（AS）的装配系统的运营策略/性能。开发，分析和比较了六个不同的博弈论决策模型，包括针对AS的集中式，两个分散式和协调式决策模型，以及针对具有直接全渠道和IMS（ASI）的装配系统的集中式和协调式决策模型。 ， 分别。根据一个电子产品案例，进行相应的数值和灵敏度分析。在此基础上，对分析和数值结果进行比较和验证，以得出管理方面的见解。二维激励区域矩阵的\（\ {\ alpha \ ge 1 \）和\（\ beta \ ge 1 \} \）将使AS和IMS提供者有动机引入和提供IMS。引入和提供IMS可以有效地增强快速响应的能力，促进协作操作并提高AS的操作性能。此外，基于收益共享合同的协调策略可以有效地提高ASI的运营绩效。