This paper provides early but broad empirical evidence on MiFID II, which requires investment firms to unbundle investment research from other costs they charge to clients. Employing difference-in-differences matched-sample research designs with firm fixed effects, we find a decrease in the number of sell-side analysts covering European firms after MiFID II implementation, particularly for firms that are less important to the sell-side. However, research quality improves; specifically, individual analyst forecasts are more accurate and stock recommendations garner greater market reactions. In addition, sell-side analysts seem to cater more to the buy-side after MiFID II by providing industry recommendations along with stock recommendations. Importantly, we predict and find evidence that buy-side investment firms turn to more in-house research after MiFID II implementation. Equally interesting, buy-side analysts increase their participation and engagement in earnings conference calls, compared to the control group. We find some evidence that stock-market liquidity decreases post MiFID II.

中文翻译：

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MiFID II对卖方分析师，买方分析师和公司的影响

本文提供了有关MiFID II的早期但广泛的经验证据，这要求投资公司将投资研究与他们收取给客户的其他费用分开。通过采用具有企业固定效应的差异差异匹配样本研究设计，我们发现在实施MiFID II之后，涵盖欧洲公司的卖方分析师的数量有所减少，尤其是对于那些对卖方而言重要性不高的公司。但是，研究质量提高了。具体来说，个别分析师的预测更为准确，而股票推荐则能引起更大的市场反应。此外，MiFID II之后，卖方分析师似乎通过提供行业建议和股票建议来迎合买方的需求。重要的，我们预测并发现有证据表明，在实施MiFID II之后，买方投资公司会进行更多内部研究。同样有趣的是，与对照组相比，买方分析师增加了对收益电话会议的参与和参与。我们发现一些证据表明，在MiFID II之后，股票市场的流动性下降。