The ability to be treated equally as a knower has in recent years become increasingly recognized as an important aspect of justice within social and political philosophy. Unfair and unjust communicative structures, institutions, and practices have the potential to reproduce and further exacerbate existing socioeconomic inequalities and injustices. Epistemic injustice is the idea that we can be unfairly discriminated against in our capacity as a knower based on prejudices about the speaker, such as gender, social background, ethnicity, race, sexuality, tone of voice, accent, and so on. The concept of epistemic injustice has fostered a large body of literature in recent years, which seeks to clarify the concept and apply it to practical cases. Yet, the literature on epistemic injustice has mainly focused on what makes an epistemic injustice epistemic—as opposed to distributive or socioeconomic—and little attention has been paid to what exactly makes an epistemic injustice an injustice. In this paper, I aim to fill this lacuna by asking under what conditions epistemic discrimination suffered by a knower becomes an epistemic injustice. In particular, I argue that we can identify five conditions that make an epistemic injustice an injustice. While the first two conditions—the disadvantage condition and the prejudice condition—are derived from Fricker’s (2007) arguments, I identify three additional conditions—the stakeholder condition, the epistemic condition, and the social justice condition—the violation of which create an epistemic injustice. The paper thus contributes to the literature on epistemic injustice by clarifying and extending existing work on epistemic injustice to identify a set of conditions through which it is possible to eliminate cases of epistemic disadvantage that are not unjust and make it easier to systematically identify and evaluate claims of epistemic injustice. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I provide a short introduction to the concept of “epistemic injustice,” why it is an important aspect of justice, and how it adversely affects those who are subject to it. In Section 3, I further identify, analyze, and discuss two conditions of epistemic injustice in Fricker (2007)—the disadvantage condition and the prejudice condition. In Section 4, I present three additional conditions that make an epistemic injustice an injustice,

中文翻译：

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是什么使认知不公正成为“不公正”？

近年来，作为知情者被平等对待的能力越来越被认为是社会和政治哲学中正义的一个重要方面。不公平和不公正的交流结构、制度和做法有可能重现并进一步加剧现有的社会经济不平等和不公正现象。认知不公正是指我们作为知情者可能会因为对说话者的偏见而受到不公平的歧视，例如性别、社会背景、种族、种族、性取向、语调、口音等。近年来，认知不公正的概念催生了大量文献，旨在澄清这一概念并将其应用于实际案例。然而，关于认识不公正的文献主要关注是什么使认识不公正成为认识论上的——而不是分配或社会经济——很少关注究竟是什么使认识不公正成为不公正。在本文中，我旨在通过询问在什么条件下认识者遭受的认知歧视成为认知不公正来填补这一空白。特别是，我认为我们可以确定使认知不公正成为不公正的五个条件。虽然前两个条件——不利条件和偏见条件——源自弗里克 (2007) 的论点，但我确定了三个附加条件——利益相关者条件、认知条件和社会正义条件——违反这些条件会产生认知不公正。因此，本文通过澄清和扩展关于认知不公正的现有工作来确定一组条件，通过这些条件可以消除并非不公正的认知劣势案例，并使系统识别和评估索赔变得更容易，从而为关于认知不公正的文献做出贡献。认识上的不公正。论文的结构如下。在第 2 节中，我简要介绍了“认知不公正”的概念，为什么它是正义的一个重要方面，以及它如何对受制于它的人产生不利影响。在第 3 节中，我进一步识别、分析和讨论了 Fricker（2007）中认知不公正的两个条件——不利条件和偏见条件。在第 4 节中，我提出了使认知不公正成为不公正的三个附加条件，