Researchers have argued that the uncertainty surrounding innovative activities causes firms to either underinvest or overinvest in research and development (R&D). We examine whether the information gained by boards through directors’ connections helps mitigate such distortions. We find that an increase in directors’ connections has an asymmetric impact on under‐ and overinvesting firms. R&D expenditures are shown to increase with board connections. Such increases in R&D intensity exacerbate the extent of overinvestment, resulting in a loss in future market‐to‐book value. The increase in R&D intensity, however, reduces underinvestment only among firms with higher than average R&D productivity. We find that increased director busyness is one cause of overinvestment.

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联结良好的董事会是否在研发活动中进行了最佳投资？

研究人员认为，围绕创新活动的不确定性会导致企业在研发（R＆D）方面投资不足或过度。我们研究董事会通过董事联系而获得的信息是否有助于减轻这种扭曲。我们发现，董事关系的增加对投资不足和投资过度的公司具有非对称影响。研究表明，研发支出随着电路板连接的增加而增加。研发强度的这种增加加剧了过度投资的程度，导致未来市场账面价值的损失。但是，R＆D强度的增加仅会降低研发生产率高于平均水平的公司中的投资不足。我们发现，董事忙碌度增加是过度投资的原因之一。