We empirically test the Expertise vs. Management friendly hypotheses of independent director tenure through dividend policies. We find that the likelihood and the level of dividends increase with independent director tenure, and firms with long-tenured directors are more likely to smooth dividends. This positive tenure–dividend relation is only evident in well-governed and low-free-cash-flow firms. The results suggest that managers use dividends as camouflage to divert public scrutiny from compromised monitoring of long-tenured directors, but they are pushed to pre-commit to dividends in well-governed firms. We also document that investors value dividends with a premium in firms with long-tenured directors, further corroborating the view that longer-tenured directors are perceived as less effective monitors. The results are robust to various variable measures and model specifications, and support the Management friendly hypothesis.

中文翻译：

---

独立董事任期及分红

我们凭经验测试专业知识与管理友好性通过股息政策对独立董事任期的假设。我们发现，随着独立董事任期的增加，分红的可能性和水平会增加，并且董事任期较长的公司更有可能平滑分红。这种积极的任期 - 股息关系仅在治理良好且自由现金流量低的公司中表现得淋漓尽致。结果表明，管理人员使用股息作为伪装，以转移公众对长期任职董事受到损害的监督的监督，但他们被迫预先承诺在治理良好的公司中分红。我们还记录了投资者对拥有长期董事任期的公司的股息的重视，进一步证实了任期较长的董事被认为是效率较低的监督者的观点。结果对各种变量测量和模型规范都是稳健的，并支持管理友好假设。