I examine whether industry tournament incentives of CEOs are associated with audit fees. I find that industry tournament incentives, measured by the compensation gap between a CEO under consideration and the second‐highest‐paid CEO among similar industries, reduce audit fees. Also, this effect is more pronounced for firms with a high level of mobility and managerial ability. To establish causality, I employ a difference‐in‐differences approach to compare the change in audit fees before and after the implementation of FAS 123R. My finding holds after I account for potential endogeneity, different industry classifications, and CFO incentive effects.

中文翻译：

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行业锦标赛奖励和审计费用

我研究了CEO的行业竞赛激励是否与审计费用相关。我发现，根据在考虑中的首席执行官与同类行业中薪酬第二高的首席执行官之间的薪酬差距来衡量的行业锦标赛激励措施可以减少审计费用。同样，对于具有高度流动性和管理能力的公司来说，这种影响更为明显。为了确定因果关系，我采用差异法比较了实施FAS 123R前后审计费用的变化。在考虑了潜在的内生性，不同的行业分类和CFO激励效应之后，我的发现成立了。