We evaluate competing hypotheses on profit skimming, asymmetric benchmarking, and the effects of implicit incentives using natural disasters as shocks to firm-specific performance. We find that compensation of both CEOs and other top executives are adjusted for exogenous changes in firm-specific performance. Moreover, the change in pay-for-performance sensitivity is greater for favorably rather than adversely affected firms. These results are stronger in firms with independent boards, new outside CEOs, and younger CEOs, where optimal contracting is more likely. Overall, our results support Feriozzi’s (2011) hypothesis that asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity can result from implicit incentives, which trigger after negative shocks.

我们评估了关于掠夺利润，不对称基准测试以及使用自然灾害作为对企业特定绩效的冲击的隐含激励措施的影响的假设。我们发现，首席执行官和其他高级管理人员的薪酬都根据公司特定绩效的外在变化进行了调整。此外，对业绩有利的公司的变化对有利而不是不利影响的公司更大。在拥有独立董事会，新的外部CEO和年轻的CEO的公司中，这些结果会更好，在这些公司中，最佳合同的可能性更大。总体而言，我们的结果支持Feriozzi（2011）的假设，即绩效隐含的不对称性可能是由隐性激励引起的，隐性激励会在负面冲击后触发。