Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are frequently renegotiated as their contracts are long-term, often with a duration exceeding 30 years, involve major investments, and are necessary incomplete. Still, while contract incompleteness is difficult to prevent, renegotiation frequency does not decline in spite of decades of experience. Electoral cycles and political connections lead to strategic behaviour by both the public sector, intending to please the electorate, and the private entity, often taking advantage of the fact that the government cannot afford disruption in public services prior to elections. The bargaining power is held mainly by private firms/corporate consortiums who extract additional rents to compensate for underbidding at the initial bidding rounds. When a consortium dominated by a foreign firm, the frequency of negotiations is higher but the extraction of rents from renegotiations is lower, reflecting a lower degree of political connectedness. Experience with PPP projects does not reduce the likelihood of subsequent renegotiations. In spite of the recommendations of the PPP supervisor (the Court of Audit), the public sector has not implemented improvements in contract design and renegotiations clauses of PPP contracts.

公私伙伴关系（PPP）经常重新谈判，因为它们的合同是长期的，期限通常超过30年，涉及大量投资，并且必要性不完整。尽管如此，尽管很难防止合同不完整，但尽管有数十年的经验，但重新谈判的频率并没有下降。选举周期和政治联系导致企图取悦选民的公共部门和私人实体经常采取战略行为，这往往是利用了政府在选举前无法承受公共服务中断的事实。讨价还价能力主要由私人公司/企业财团拥有，他们在最初的招标中提取额外的租金以补偿竞标者的不足。当一个财团被外国公司支配时，谈判的频率较高，但从重新谈判中收取的租金较低，这反映出政治联系程度较低。PPP项目的经验不会减少后续重新谈判的可能性。尽管有PPP主管（审计法院）的建议，公共部门仍未对PPP合同的合同设计和重新谈判条款进行改进。