This paper analyzes the effect of multimarket contact on bank competition. We propose a completely new multimarket contact indicator that not only considers the existence of contacts between banks, but also their intensity, by analyzing the strength–weakness position of banks in terms of branch numbers in comparison to their rivals in the markets where they coincide. We test the new indicator empirically in the context of the Spanish banking sector. The main results suggest a negative relationship between market power and the number of multimarket contacts, rejecting the hypothesis of tacit collusion in the Spanish banking sector. However, the result changes completely when we consider the intensity of the contacts, since there is evidence of collusion among banks. Therefore, in the Spanish banking sector, consolidation of the sector has led to an increase in market power due to the effect of the increase in the dominant position of incumbent banks, although the impact has been very small.

本文分析了多市场联系对银行竞争的影响。我们提出了一种全新的多市场联系指标，该指标不仅可以通过分析分行数量上的银行的实力/弱势位置，还可以比较其竞争对手所在市场中的竞争对手，从而考虑到银行之间的联系，也可以考虑它们之间的联系程度。我们在西班牙银行业的背景下对新指标进行了经验检验。主要结果表明，市场支配力与多市场联系的数量之间存在负相关关系，驳斥了西班牙银行业默契合谋的假说。但是，由于有银行间串通的证据，当我们考虑联系的强度时，结果将完全改变。因此，在西班牙银行业，