I model investors who are only able to access equity markets through a broker. These brokers have an incentive to route based on the fees charged by exchanges, rather than on execution quality for their clients. This conflict of interest reduces investor utility, as they must pay higher commissions to have orders sent to exchanges with the best market quality. I show that regulators may be able to improve investor utility by allowing investors to self-direct order flow.

中文翻译：

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限价单市场中的经纪商路由决策

我模拟只能通过经纪人进入股票市场的投资者。这些经纪人有动力根据交易所收取的费用进行路由，而不是根据客户的执行质量。这种利益冲突降低了投资者的效用，因为他们必须支付更高的佣金才能将订单发送到具有最佳市场质量的交易所。我表明，监管机构可能能够通过允许投资者自行引导订单流来提高投资者效用。