This paper proposes a theory of redemption runs based on strategic information acquisition by fund managers. We argue that liquidity lines provided by third parties can be a source of financial fragility, as they incentivize fund managers to acquire private information about the value of their assets. This strategic information acquisition can lead to inefficient market liquidity dry-ups caused by self-fulfilling fears of adverse selection. By lowering asset prices, information acquisition also reduces the value of funds’ assets-under-management and may spur inefficient redemption runs by investors. Two different regimes can arise: one in which funds’ information acquisition incentives are unaffected by the volume of redemptions, and another where market and funding liquidity risk mutually reinforce each other.

本文提出了一种基于基金经理战略信息获取的赎回运行理论。我们认为，第三方提供的流动性额度可能是财务脆弱性的一个来源，因为它们会激励基金经理获取有关其资产价值的私人信息。这种战略性信息获取可能导致由于对逆向选择的自我实现恐惧而导致的低效市场流动性枯竭。通过降低资产价格，信息获取也降低了基金管理资产的价值，并可能刺激投资者进行低效的赎回。可能会出现两种不同的制度：一种是基金的信息获取激励不受赎回量的影响，另一种是市场和资金流动性风险相互加强。