We examine how exogenous changes in analyst coverage influence (1) the likelihood that managers will voluntarily disclose customized (non-GAAP) performance metrics and (2) the relative quality of their non-GAAP disclosures. Specifically, we use a quasi-natural-experimental setting in which brokerage firms terminate analyst coverage and find that, following an unanticipated decrease in analyst coverage, managers are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings per share (EPS) numbers. We also find that managers become more aggressive in their disclosure choices and that the quality of their non-GAAP exclusions decreases after analysts terminate coverage. These effects are more pronounced among firms losing an analyst with greater ability and firms with weaker corporate governance. Overall, our evidence suggests that analysts’ monitoring deters aggressive non-GAAP reporting.

我们研究了分析师覆盖率的外源变化如何影响（1）经理自愿披露自定义（非GAAP）绩效指标的可能性，以及（2）相对质量非GAAP披露。具体来说，我们使用一种准自然的实验环境，在这种环境中，经纪公司终止了分析师的研究范围，发现，在分析师的研究范围意外下降之后，管理人员更有可能披露非公认会计原则的每股收益（EPS）数据。我们还发现，经理在选择披露方面变得更具进取心，并且在分析师终止承保范围之后，其非公认会计准则除外条件的质量下降。这些影响在失去能力更高的分析师的公司和公司治理较弱的公司中更为明显。总体而言，我们的证据表明，分析师的监督阻止了积极的非GAAP报告。