In this paper, we explore the assumption that blame-attribution can be an effective rhetorical strategy for non-elite interest groups who want power holders to be attentive to their demands. Through a qualitative analysis of two pro-migrant campaigns led by grassroot activists in Sweden, one taking place in 2005 and the other in 2017, we offer a nuanced empirical examination of non-elite initiated blame-games. We show how perceived responsibility influences these blame-games, and explore which policy consequences might emanate from them. We demonstrate that blame-making, under certain conditions, can be a successful strategy to gain policy influence, but that this strategy is conditioned by the complexity and transparency of the institutional arrangements of accountability within the policy sector. The focus on non-elite blame-making in order to change policies enables us to contribute to the theoretical discussion on the relationship between anticipatory and reactive forms of blame-avoidance behaviours, and to discuss the democratic implications of blame-games in both shorter and longer time perspectives. One implication of this study is that successful non-elite blame-making at one point in time actually can lower the chances of successful blame-making in the future.

在本文中，我们探讨了这样一个假设：对于希望让权力持有者关注其需求的非精英利益集团，归咎于资产可以是一种有效的修辞策略。通过对瑞典基层活动家领导的两次亲移民运动的定性分析，一次是在2005年发生，另一次是在2017年，我们对非精英发起的指责游戏进行了细致的实证检验。我们将展示责任感如何影响这些责任博弈，并探讨可能从中产生哪些政策后果。我们证明，在某些情况下，进行责怪可能是获得政策影响的成功策略，但是该策略受制于政策部门内部问责制的体制安排的复杂性和透明度。为了改变政策而将注意力集中在非精英责任制上，这使我们能够为关于避免责任行为的预期形式和反应形式之间的关系的理论讨论作出贡献，并讨论短期和短期内责任游戏的民主含义。时间更长的观点。这项研究的一个含义是，在某个时间点成功进行非精英责备实际上可以降低将来成功进行责备的机会。