This theoretical paper extends the pioneering articles on relationship lending (e.g., Sharpe. J Finance XLV(4): 1069-1087, 1990 ; Rajan. J Financ 47: 1367–1400, 1992 ; von Thadden. Financ Res Lett 1(1): 11–23, 2004 ) by examining relationship lending and hold-up problems in credit markets when borrowers are identical and banks are different. The results show that existing borrowers are informationally captured by good banks and yield profits to them, but new borrowers are unprofitable. In this market, short-term loan contracts and unsecured loans are optimal while loan commitments should not be used. Further, banks and borrowers have long-term relationships. This paper challenges the standard theories on product quality, reputation and experience goods by introducing scenarios in which good and bad banks can retain their existing borrowers. In the standard theories, consumers leave bad producers and search for good ones.

中文翻译：

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银行类型信息不对称下的关系借贷与转换成本

这篇理论论文扩展了关系借贷的开创性文章（例如，Sharpe. J Finance XLV(4): 1069-1087, 1990 ; Rajan. J Financ 47: 1367–1400, 1992 ; von Thadden.Financ Res Lett 1(1) : 11–23, 2004 ) 通过检查当借款人相同而银行不同时信贷市场中的关系贷款和拖延问题。结果表明，现有借款人被优秀银行获取信息并为他们带来利润，但新借款人无利可图。在这个市场上，短期贷款合同和无抵押贷款是最佳的，而不应使用贷款承诺。此外，银行和借款人有着长期的关系。本文通过介绍好坏银行可以留住现有借款人的场景，挑战关于产品质量、声誉和体验商品的标准理论。