Global governance complexes offer member states opportunities for “regime shifting”: playing off an institutional forum against another with the goal of improving one’s relative bargaining position. I probe the internal validity of this strategy. The model makes two contributions to the governance complex literature. Formally, first, the analysis goes beyond current “outside-option” models of regime shifting, involving a permanent break of negotiations, to “inside-option” models, involving temporary disagreements. Substantively, second, the article models two scenarios of regime shifting, one that works for the weak and another that works for the powerful, and then “tests” the claim held by some in the literature that powerful countries are more likely to avail themselves of the possibility of regime shifting than weaker countries. I conclude that regime shifting is more likely to work for the weak than for the strong.

全球治理综合体为成员国提供了“体制转变”的机会：与一个机构论坛对抗另一机构论坛，以提高一个人的相对议价地位。我探讨了该策略的内部有效性。该模型对治理复杂文献做出了两个贡献。形式上，首先，分析超出了当前政权转移的“外部选择”模式，涉及永久性的谈判中断，而超出了涉及暂时性分歧的“内部选择”模式。实质上，第二，本文模拟了两种政权转移的情况，一种是为弱者服务，另一种是为强国服务，然后“检验”某些文献中关于强国更可能利用自己的主张的主张。与实力较弱的国家相比，政权更替的可能性。