This paper studies a decentralized college admissions game with single application motivated by college admissions in many countries such as Japan, Russia, South Korea and United States. Students sequentially apply to colleges, one application for each student, and commit to attend whenever they are admitted. We introduce a natural equilibrium refinement and describe the equilibrium behavior. It is a simple strategy that consists of running the well-known student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) for modified preferences. Students and colleges are divided along the outcome of DA. Students find the outcome of every equilibrium at least as good as the outcome of DA, and colleges find the outcome of DA at least as good as the outcome of every equilibrium.

本文研究了在许多国家（例如日本，俄罗斯，韩国和美国）以大学录取为动机的分散式大学录取游戏。学生依次申请大学，每位学生一份申请，并承诺在被录取时就去参加。我们引入自然平衡细化并描述平衡行为。这是一种简单的策略，其中包括运行针对修改的首选项的著名的学生提议的递延接受算法（DA）。根据发展议程的结果，学生和大学是分开的。学生发现每个平衡的结果至少与DA的结果一样好，而大学发现DA的结果至少与每个均衡的结果一样好。