Reviewed by:

• Taking Nazi Technology: Allied Exploitation of German Science after the Second World War by Douglas O'Reagan
• Bruce Seely (bio)

Taking Nazi Technology is an important addition to the lengthy literature that historians of technology have generated about a classic area of inquiry—technology transfer. Recently scholars have characterized the movement of technology as diffusion, circulation, or flows; others have labeled it knowledge management. But the traditional designation still seems appropriate in this instance.

The focus of Douglas O'Reagan's study—the desire of the victorious Allies to benefit from Nazi science and technology after 1945—has long been recognized as an important example of attempts to transfer technology across national boundaries. But as the author notes, most earlier studies [End Page 1236] rather narrowly explored the acquisition of German science and technology—such as missile and rocket systems. O'Reagan's account, however, offers a unique comparative perspective and covers a much broader swath of terrain, both in terms of the activities examined and the time frame.

O'Reagan's first four chapters compare the efforts of the four Allied powers to exploit German science, technology, and industrial knowledge after 1945. His analysis is at the national level and explores the organization and structure of these efforts. In some respects, these chapters discuss national bureaucracies and policy. O'Reagan identifies significant differences in national styles and places these efforts within the context of well-known tensions between the Allies after the war. Those tensions included not only the Cold War rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also competitive differences between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United States sought to disseminate information to its stakeholders through a massive document collection effort, while the Soviet Union seized factories and people outright for both reparations and technological knowledge. The United Kingdom sought industrial knowledge to offset its apparent decline as an industrial power. The French exhibited a more cooperative approach, prefiguring the trans-European collaboration that ultimately resulted in the European Union. Within these comparative discussions, the author identifies what worked and assesses the overall impact of these large-scale attempts to collect German science and technology. Significantly O'Reagan concludes that despite a few high-profile success stories in rocketry, the direct benefits to the Allies were not enormous.

A fifth chapter examines the realignment of German academic science in the postwar period, under the direction of the same agencies responsible for appropriating German technology. O'Reagan continues his comparative approach, showing that each Allied country developed different plans for de-Nazification and the restriction of German redevelopment, while also preventing German scientists and technicians from working for other Allies. But the emergence of the Cold War shifted the focus to rebuilding Germany, and especially its scientific establishments. O'Reagan uses this chapter to reinforce the overall importance of science and science policy in the development of nations after 1945.

A final substantive chapter explores the development of document and information systems to disseminate German records in the Allied nations. This section constitutes an important topic no other scholar has examined. O'Reagan connects postwar data dissemination with earlier attempts to create scientific libraries and knowledge diffusion programs from the nineteenth century forward. The chapter touches on information technology, the internationalization of science, and the role of government in science.

The book's conclusion is a fine summation of both the immediate and broader consequences of the frenzy to acquire German science and technology [End Page 1237] after World War II. In terms of immediate issues, the author confirms the findings of other historians that people and know-how are more vital to successful technology transfer programs than documents and drawings. His discussion of know-how is an especially important contribution. As for the broader questions, O'Reagan links the Allies' postwar technology acquisition activities to later steps such as the Marshall Plan, Eisenhower's Point Four Program on nuclear energy, the rise of the European economic and political community, and Cold War efforts to...

审核人：

• 以纳粹技术：德国科学的联合开发在第二次世界大战后由道格拉斯·奥里根
• 布鲁斯·西利（生物）

纳粹技术是对技术史学家关于经典询问领域（技术转让）的冗长文献的重要补充。最近，学者们将技术运动的特征描述为扩散，循环或流动。其他人将其标记为知识管理。但是在这种情况下，传统名称似乎仍然合适。

道格拉斯·奥里根（Douglas O'Reagan）的研究重点-胜利的盟国渴望1945年后从纳粹科学技术中受益的渴望-长期以来被认为是试图跨越国界转让技术的重要例子。但是正如作者所指出的那样，最早期的研究[第1236页结束]只是狭义地探索了德国科学技术的获取，例如导弹和火箭系统。然而，无论是在考察的活动还是在时间框架上，奥里根的叙述都提供了独特的比较视角，涵盖了更广阔的领域。

奥雷根的前四章比较了四大盟国在1945年之后开发德国科学，技术和工业知识的努力。他的分析是在国家层面进行的，并探讨了这些努力的组织和结构。在某些方面，这些章节讨论了国家官僚机构和政策。奥里根（O'Reagan）发现了民族风格上的重大差异，并将这些努力置于战后盟国之间众所周知的紧张局势中。这些紧张关系不仅包括美国与苏联之间的冷战竞争，还包括法国，英国和美国之间的竞争差异。美国试图通过大量的文件收集工作向其利益相关者传播信息，苏联则同时夺取了工厂和人民的补偿和技术知识。英国寻求工业知识以弥补其作为工业强国的明显衰落。法国人展示了一种更合作的态度，预示了跨欧洲的合作，最终促成了欧洲联盟。在这些比较性讨论中，作者确定了有效的方法，并评估了这些大规模尝试收集德国科学技术的总体影响。值得一提的是，奥里根得出的结论是，尽管在火箭技术领域取得了一些引人注目的成功故事，但对盟军的直接好处并不多。法国人展示了一种更合作的态度，预示了跨欧洲的合作，最终促成了欧洲联盟。在这些比较性讨论中，作者确定了有效的方法，并评估了这些大规模尝试收集德国科学技术的总体影响。值得一提的是，奥里根得出的结论是，尽管在火箭技术领域取得了一些引人注目的成功故事，但对盟军的直接好处并不多。法国人展示了一种更合作的态度，预示了跨欧洲的合作，最终促成了欧洲联盟。在这些比较性讨论中，作者确定了有效的方法，并评估了这些大规模尝试收集德国科学技术的总体影响。值得一提的是，奥里根得出的结论是，尽管在火箭技术领域取得了一些引人注目的成功故事，但对盟军的直接好处并不多。

第五章考察了战后时期德国学术科学的重新调整，这些研究是在负责使用德国技术的相同机构的指导下进行的。奥里根继续他的比较方法，表明每个盟国制定了不同的脱纳兹计划和限制德国重建的计划，同时也阻止了德国科学家和技术人员为其他盟国工作。但是冷战的出现将重心转移到了重建德国，特别是其科学机构。奥里根（O'Reagan）使用这一章来强调科学和科学政策在1945年后国家发展中的整体重要性。

最后的实质性章节探讨了文件和信息系统的发展，以在盟国中传播德国的记录。本节构成其他学者没有研究过的重要主题。O'Reagan将战后的数据传播与19世纪以前创建科学图书馆和知识传播计划的早期尝试联系在一起。本章涉及信息技术，科学的国际化以及政府在科学中的作用。

该书的结论很好地概括了二战后狂热地收购德国科学技术的直接后果和更广泛的后果[结束第1237页]。在眼前的问题上，作者证实了其他历史学家的发现，即与技术和文件相比，人员和专有技术对成功的技术转让计划至关重要。他对专有技术的讨论尤其重要。至于更广泛的问题，奥里根将同盟国的战后技术获取活动与后来的步骤联系起来，例如马歇尔计划，艾森豪威尔的核能四点计划，欧洲经济和政治共同体的崛起以及冷战的努力。 ..