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Emotion as a source of moral understanding in conservation
Conservation Biology ( IF 5.2 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-06 , DOI: 10.1111/cobi.13689
Chelsea Batavia 1 , Michael Paul Nelson 1 , Jeremy T Bruskotter 2 , Megan S Jones 3 , Esty Yanco 4 , Daniel Ramp 4 , Marc Bekoff 5 , Arian D Wallach 4
Affiliation  

Recent debates around the meaning and implications of compassionate conservation suggest that some conservationists consider emotion a false and misleading basis for moral judgment and decision making. We trace these beliefs to a long-standing, gendered sociocultural convention and argue that the disparagement of emotion as a source of moral understanding is both empirically and morally problematic. According to the current scientific and philosophical understanding, reason and emotion are better understood as partners, rather than opposites. Nonetheless, the two have historically been seen as separate, with reason elevated in association with masculinity and emotion (especially nurturing emotion) dismissed or delegitimated in association with femininity. These associations can be situated in a broader, dualistic, and hierarchical logic used to maintain power for a dominant male (White, able-bodied, upper class, heterosexual) human class. We argue that emotion should be affirmed by conservationists for the novel and essential insights it contributes to conservation ethics. We consider the specific example of compassion and characterize it as an emotional experience of interdependence and shared vulnerability. This experience highlights conservationists’ responsibilities to individual beings, enhancing established and widely accepted beliefs that conservationists have a duty to protect populations, species, and ecosystems (or biodiversity). We argue compassion, thus understood, should be embraced as a core virtue of conservation.

中文翻译:

情感作为保护中道德理解的源泉

最近围绕富有同情心的保护的意义和含义的辩论表明,一些保护主义者认为情绪是道德判断和决策的错误和误导性基础。我们将这些信念追溯到一个长期存在的、性别化的社会文化习俗,并认为将情感贬低为道德理解的来源在经验上和道德上都是有问题的。按照目前的科学和哲学理解,理性和情感最好被理解为伙伴,而不是对立。尽管如此,这两者在历史上一直被视为独立的,与男性气质相关的理性被提升,而与女性气质相关的情感(尤其是滋养情感)被忽视或不合法。这些关联可以位于一个更广泛的、二元的、和等级逻辑用于维持占统治地位的男性(白人、健全的、上层阶级、异性恋)人类阶级的权力。我们认为,保护主义者应该肯定情感,因为它有助于保护伦理学的新颖而重要的见解。我们考虑同情的具体例子,并将其描述为相互依赖和共同脆弱的情感体验。这一经历凸显了环保主义者对个体的责任,强化了既定且广泛接受的信念,即环保主义者有责任保护种群、物种和生态系统(或生物多样性)。我们认为,如此理解的同情心应该被视为保护的核心美德。我们认为,保护主义者应该肯定情感,因为它有助于保护伦理学的新颖而重要的见解。我们考虑同情的具体例子,并将其描述为相互依赖和共同脆弱的情感体验。这一经历凸显了环保主义者对个体的责任,强化了既定且广泛接受的信念,即环保主义者有责任保护种群、物种和生态系统(或生物多样性)。我们认为,如此理解的同情心应该被视为保护的核心美德。我们认为,保护主义者应该肯定情感,因为它有助于保护伦理学的新颖而重要的见解。我们考虑同情的具体例子,并将其描述为相互依赖和共同脆弱的情感体验。这一经历凸显了环保主义者对个体的责任,强化了既定且广泛接受的信念,即环保主义者有责任保护种群、物种和生态系统(或生物多样性)。我们认为,如此理解的同情心应该被视为保护的核心美德。这一经历凸显了环保主义者对个体的责任,强化了既定且广泛接受的信念,即环保主义者有责任保护种群、物种和生态系统(或生物多样性)。我们认为,如此理解的同情心应该被视为保护的核心美德。这一经历凸显了环保主义者对个体的责任,强化了既定且广泛接受的信念,即环保主义者有责任保护种群、物种和生态系统(或生物多样性)。我们认为,如此理解的同情心应该被视为保护的核心美德。
更新日期:2021-01-06
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