We present a novel donation game model to investigate the impact of reputation on the evolution of tag-mediated altruistic behaviors, in which the donors need to simultaneously take the information of a recipient’s reputation and tag into account when making decisions. In detail, each individual can be randomly endowed with a tunable reputation value and a fixed tag at the initial stage, the donor’s reputation will be adaptively varied by the adjustment increment $R_g$ according to the action at each game round. In addition, another tunable parameter $\omega$ is used to control the strategy spreading ability of the individual with lower reputation. Through extensive simulations, the results indicate that the combination of reputation and tag greatly promotes the evolution of altruistic behaviors within the structured population. When other parameters are fixed, the smaller the value of $\omega$ is, the more obvious the advantage of dominant strategy becomes. It is also found that the reputation threshold has a decisive effect on the dominant strategy within the population. The current results suggest that the reputation contributes significantly to the evolution of cooperation in the population with the green beard effect, we hope our work can provide some valuable clues for exploring the altruistic behaviors in the future.

我们提出了一种新颖的捐赠博弈模型，以研究声誉对标签介导的利他行为演变的影响，在捐赠模型中，捐赠者在决策时需要同时考虑收件人声誉和标签的信息。详细地说，在初始阶段，每个人都可以随机获得可调整的声誉值和固定标签，捐赠者的声誉将通过调整增量来适应性地变化。${\mathrm{[R}}_G$根据每个游戏回合的动作。此外，另一个可调参数$\omega$用于控制信誉较低的个人的策略传播能力。通过广泛的模拟，结果表明，声誉和标签的组合极大地促进了结构化群体内部利他行为的演变。固定其他参数时，的值越小$\omega$是，优势策略的优势变得更加明显。还发现，声誉阈值对人口中的主导策略具有决定性的影响。目前的结果表明，声誉以绿色胡须效应极大地促进了人口合作的发展，我们希望我们的工作可以为将来探索利他行为提供一些有价值的线索。