The Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council of India has a non-conventional weighted voting procedure having a primary player who is a blocker and a set of secondary players. The voting weights are not fixed and are determined based on the subset of players which participate in the voting. We introduce the notion of voting schema to formally model such a voting procedure. Individual voting games arise from a voting schema depending on the subset of secondary players who participate in the voting. We make a detailed formal study of the trade-off between the minimal sizes of winning and blocking coalitions in the voting games that can arise from a voting schema. Finally, the GST voting procedure is assessed using the theoretical results leading to suggestions for improvement.

印度商品及服务税（GST）理事会采用非常规加权投票程序，其主要参与者为障碍者，而辅助参与者为一组。投票权重不是固定的，而是根据参与投票的玩家子集确定的。我们引入投票模式的概念来对这种投票程序进行正式建模。个体投票游戏取决于参与投票的次要玩家的子集而产生于投票模式。我们对投票模式中可能产生的最小和最小的获胜联盟与阻止联盟之间的取舍进行了正式的研究。最后，使用理论结果评估了商品及服务税的投票程序，从而提出了改进建议。