As the economy has grown increasingly financialized, the relationship between financial innovation and instability has attracted more attention. Previous research finds that the proliferation of complex financial innovations, like asset securitization and new financial derivatives, helped to erode the market governance arrangements that kept excessive bank risk-taking in check, inviting instability. This article presents an alternative way of understanding how financial innovations and market governance arrangements combine to shape instability. Market governance arrangements also shape how financial firms receive innovations, leading to greater or lesser instability at particular times and places. I illustrate this argument by tracing the effects of changing corporate governance arrangements at large US banks in the 1990s and 2000s. Like non-financial firms in the preceding decade, banks adopted reforms associated with the shareholder value model of corporate governance. These changes to internal bank governance arrangements affected the agendas of bank executives in ways that encouraged expanded use of securitization and derivatives. Drawing from this case, I argue that a full understanding of instability in the financialized era requires closer attention to the (institutionally-structured) interests of financial innovation users —not just to features of financial innovations themselves.

中文翻译：

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市场治理、金融创新和金融不稳定：银行采用股东价值管理的经验教训

随着经济日益金融化，金融创新与不稳定之间的关系越来越受到关注。先前的研究发现，资产证券化和新的金融衍生品等复杂金融创新的激增，有助于削弱抑制银行过度冒险的市场治理安排，从而引发不稳定。本文提出了另一种理解金融创新和市场治理安排如何结合形成不稳定的方法。市场治理安排也会影响金融公司接受创新的方式，从而导致特定时间和地点或多或少的不稳定。我通过追溯 1990 年代和 2000 年代美国大型银行改变公司治理安排的影响来说明这一论点。与前十年的非金融公司一样，银行采用了与公司治理的股东价值模型相关的改革。银行内部治理安排的这些变化以鼓励扩大使用证券化和衍生工具的方式影响了银行高管的议程。从这个案例中，我认为要充分理解金融化时代的不稳定性，需要更加关注金融创新用户的（制度结构）利益——而不仅仅是金融创新本身的特征。