The development of the antisatellite (ASAT) weapons is a crucial process of the second era of space militarization. As a result, outer space loses the status of a sanctuary. However, this process does not steam only from the technological advance but also from strategic circumstances. The increasing number of space actors makes the system less stable. The degree of dependency on space assets is significantly different in different countries, what creates the vulnerability gap. What is more, the capability to defend a space infrastructure is profoundly limited due to physical and technological limitations, favoring offensive actions. Outer space is turning into offense-dominant domain.

The growing risk of using ASAT weapons and the paramount importance of satellites in supporting armed forces prompt a search for protecting space infrastructure. Therefore, the space deterrence seems to be an attractive tool of increasing the security of space assets. So far, this branch of deterrence has been in the margins of strategic studies as the possibilities of undertaking action against space assets were very limited.

The aim of the article is to analyze the adequacy of the development of the space deterrence concept, with the respect for strategic and technological circumstances and to compare it to nuclear deterrence as being one of the most examined deterrence concepts. The starting point for the analysis is the general characteristics of deterrence concept with special regard to nuclear deterrence as an example of its effective application (even though the capability to generate deterrent effect is still in dispute). This article subsequently examines the reasons making the space deterrence a current and important issue – the end of sanctuary and the creation of new battlefield in outer space, resulting from the pursuit of operational deployment of ASAT weapons. The strategic consideration is taken into account, including asymmetric dependence on space assets and, consequently, unfavorable to US military benefit-risk balance of space warfare. The difficulties in protecting the space infrastructure, favoring offensive action, are examined. The parallelism between nuclear and space deterrence is indicated two key differences – the lack of existential threat and retaliation credibility characterizes space deterrence. Based on these theoretical frameworks, the sample of escalation ladder in space is proposed. It should be stressed that the ladder refers only to the attack on space infrastructure (and the attack from space at the top of the ladder). The subsequent section thus attempts to answer the question where an attack on satellites should be placed on the escalation ladder. Should the hypothetical retaliation be limited to space infrastructure? The key conclusion of the analysis is that building space deterrence as an independent construct is not justified.

反卫星武器的发展是第二个太空军事化时代的关键过程。结果，外层空间失去了庇护所的地位。但是，此过程不仅源于技术进步，而且源于战略环境。空间参与者的数量不断增加，使系统不稳定。不同国家对空间资产的依赖程度明显不同，这造成了脆弱性缺口。而且，由于物理和技术上的限制，捍卫太空基础设施的能力受到极大的限制，有利于进攻性行动。外层空间正在变成进攻为主的领域。

使用ASAT武器的风险与日俱增，卫星在支持武装部队方面的最重要意义促使人们寻求保护空间基础设施。因此，空间威慑似乎是增加空间资产安全性的一种有吸引力的工具。迄今为止，威慑这一分支一直处于战略研究的边缘，因为对空间资产采取行动的可能性非常有限。

本文的目的是分析空间威慑概念发展的充分性，同时尊重战略和技术环境，并将其与核威慑作比较，核威慑是最受研究的威慑概念之一。分析的出发点是威慑概念的一般特征，并以核威慑作为有效应用的一个例子（尽管产生威慑作用的能力仍存在争议）。本文随后探讨了使空间威慑成为当前和重要问题的原因-避难所的结束和在太空中追求ASAT武器的部署导致了新的外战场的建立。考虑到战略考虑，包括对太空资产的不对称依赖，因此不利于美军太空战争的利益与风险之间的平衡。审查了保护空间基础设施，支持进攻性行动的困难。核威慑与空间威慑之间的平行性表明了两个主要差异–缺乏生存威胁和报复信誉是空间威慑的特征。在这些理论框架的基础上，提出了空间阶梯的样本。应该强调的是，梯子仅指对空间基础设施的攻击（以及梯子顶部来自太空的攻击）。因此，随后的部分试图回答在升级阶梯上应放置卫星攻击的问题。假设的报复是否应仅限于太空基础设施？该分析的主要结论是，建立空间威慑作为一个独立的结构是不合理的。