This article investigates the relation between a theorist’s theories and his daily life practices, using Émile Durkheim as an example. That theory and practice should be consistent seems not only scientifically proper but also morally right. Yet the concept of consistency conceals several different standards: consistency with one’s own theoretical arguments, consistency with outsiders’ judgments of oneself, and consistency within one’s arguments (and actions) across time and social space. Analysis of 750 pages of Durkheim’s letters shows that Durkheim lived a life consistent with and informed by his theories for most of his career. In his professional relations, his personal relations, and his political positions, Durkheim’s moral activity usually proceeds from his theoretical commitments. However, the death of his son in combat could not be theorized within the Durkheimian system, and it broke up this long stable pattern. The analysis concludes that under modern conditions, the issue of moral consistency relates closely to the general problem of solidarity and invites more complex theorization.

中文翻译：

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生命理论：埃米尔·杜克海姆生活中的道德一致性

本文以埃米尔·迪尔克海姆（ÉmileDurkheim）为例，研究了理论家的理论与其日常生活实践之间的关系。理论和实践应该保持一致，这不仅在科学上是正确的，而且在道德上也是正确的。然而，一致性的概念掩盖了几种不同的标准：与一个人自己的理论论点的一致性，与局外人对自己的判断的一致性，一个人的论证（和行动）在时间和社会空间中的一致性。对750页涂尔干书信的分析表明，涂尔干在他的大部分职业中都过着与自己的理论相符并受其理论启发的生活。在他的职业关系，他的个人关系和他的政治立场中，涂尔干的道德活动通常源于他的理论承诺。然而，他的儿子在战斗中的死亡无法在涂尔干体系中进行理论推论，这打破了这种长期稳定的格局。分析得出的结论是，在现代条件下，道德一致性问题与团结的普遍问题密切相关，并引发了更为复杂的理论化。