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A reflection on the trading of pollution rights via land use exchanges and controls: Coase Theorems, Coase’s land use parable, and Schumpeterian innovations
Progress in Planning ( IF 5.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.progress.2018.10.001
Lawrence W.C. Lai , Frank Lorne , Stephen N.G. Davies

Abstract This monograph attempts to connect various versions of the Coase Theorem to carbon trading as a means to help ameliorate global warming and manifests their relevance to designs of land-based environmental policies with reference to such established land use planning tools as zoning and the transfer of development rights. These land-based policies, which are in line with the received concept of “transfer of development rights”, are demonstrably sustainable and they are easier to monitor physically than trading in greenhouse gas emissions. The discussion is in support of and articulates with the “land use, land-use change and forestry” (LULUCF) endeavours of the Kyoto Protocol and is timely, as global warming is a real environmental issue. The supposition that Coasian economics, under the spell of the false plan/market dichotomy in both the academic and the political arena, is inherently alien to sustainable development is wrong. The argument below involves four versions of Coase Theorem. Two were formulated by George Stigler based on Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960), a treatise against Arthur Pigou’s concept of pollution. The remaining two are those that in The Firm, the Market and the Law Coase considered his actual theorems. The theorems are supportive of government planning rules including “transfer of development rights” (TDR) and land readjustment. Despite seeming to be restrictive quotas, they actually enable innovations that can promote sustainable development, as envisaged in Yu’s Coasian-Schumpeterian model of creative destruction (Yu et al., 2000). Standard supply and demand graphs and examples are used to demonstrate the compatibility of our reasoning with standard neoclassical economic tools.

中文翻译:

通过土地使用交换和控制进行污染权交易的思考:科斯定理、科斯的土地使用寓言和熊彼特的创新

摘要 本专着试图将科斯定理的各种版本与碳交易联系起来,作为帮助缓解全球变暖的一种手段,并参考诸如分区和转让等已建立的土地利用规划工具,表明它们与基于土地的环境政策设计的相关性。发展权。这些基于土地的政策符合公认的“发展权转让”概念,具有明显的可持续性,而且与温室气体排放交易相比,它们更容易进行实物监测。由于全球变暖是一个真正的环境问题,讨论支持并阐明了《京都议定书》中“土地利用、土地利用变化和林业”(LULUCF)的努力,并且是及时的。科斯经济学假设,在学术和政治领域的错误计划/市场二分法的魔咒下,与可持续发展本质上格格不入是错误的。下面的论证涉及科斯定理的四个版本。两个是由乔治·斯蒂格勒根据科斯的“社会成本问题”(1960 年)制定的,这是一篇反对亚瑟·庇古的污染概念的论文。剩下的两个是在《公司、市场和法律》中科斯考虑了他的实际定理的那些。这些定理支持政府规划规则,包括“发展权转让”(TDR)和土地调整。尽管似乎是限制性配额,但它们实际上可以促进可持续发展的创新,正如 Yu 的 Coasian-Schumpeterian 创造性破坏模型所设想的那样(Yu 等,2000)。
更新日期:2020-04-01
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